Enhanced Performance and Privacy for TLS over TCP Fast Open by Sy, Erik et al.
Enhanced Performance and Privacy for TLS over TCP Fast Open
Erik Sy
University of Hamburg
Tobias Mueller
University of Hamburg
Christian Burkert
University of Hamburg
Hannes Federrath
University of Hamburg
Mathias Fischer
University of Hamburg
ABSTRACT
Small TCP flows make up the majority of web flows. For them, the
TCP three-way handshake represents a significant delay overhead.
The TCP Fast Open (TFO) protocol provides zero round-trip time
(0-RTT) handshakes for subsequent TCP connections to the same
host. In this paper, we present real-world privacy and performance
limitations of TFO. We investigated its deployment on popular
websites and browsers. We found that a client revisiting a web site
for the first time fails to use an abbreviated TFO handshake about
40% of the time due to web server load-balancing. Our analysis
further reveals significant privacy problems in the protocol design
and implementation. Network-based attackers and online trackers
can exploit these shortcomings to track the online activities of users.
As a countermeasure, we introduce a novel protocol called TCP
Fast Open Privacy (FOP). It overcomes the performance and privacy
limitations of TLS over TFO by utilizing a custom TLS extension.
TCP FOP prevents tracking by network attackers and impedes third-
party tracking, while still allowing for 0-RTT handshakes as in TFO.
As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented the proposed protocol.
Our measurements indicate that TCP FOP outperforms TLS over
TFO when websites are served from multiple IP addresses.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy; • Networks → Network protocols; Net-
work protocol design;
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1 INTRODUCTION
TCP is the standard protocol for transmitting information on the
Internet. The web is moving towards an encrypted ecosystem with
about 80% of the client requests deploying encryption [11]. A pop-
ular web page requires an average of about 20 TLS over TCP con-
nections to several hosts [32]. Hence, 20 TCP and TLS handshakes
are required for initiating these connections. Especially for short
web flows, this handshake delay represents significant overhead.
The TCP Fast Open Protocol (TFO) [7] is adopted by most operat-
ing systems and browsers, even though it is not yet actively used by
all of them. It works by abbreviating TCP’s three-way handshake
for all consecutive connections between a client-server pair. As
such, TFO requires an initial full TCP handshake to let the server
verify the client IP and to exchange an identifier as proof of this
verification for all successive TFO connections. However, while
providing significant speedups, this identifier can be used to link
TFO sessions and thus be exploited by an online tracker to collect
profiles of the browsing behavior of users. Furthermore, as TFO
messages are unencrypted, it also enables user tracking through
passive network monitoring like dragnet surveillance. Tracking
via the TFO protocol is also independent of traditional tracking
practices utilizing HTTP cookies or browser fingerprinting [8].
Thus, existing countermeasures against conventional tracking do
not protect against tracking via TFO.
To balance the legitimate needs of online privacy and faster TLS
over TCP connections, we propose the TCP Fast Open Privacy (TCP
FOP) protocol as main contribution of this paper.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to describe
tracking via TFO cookies. Passive network attackers and
online services can use these cookies to link website visits
to the same user. We find that the TFO protocol provides no
measures to restrict this tracking mechanism.
• We found that under real-world conditions, the first revisit
of a website supporting the TFO protocol fails, on average,
approximately 40% of the time to perform an abbreviated
handshake. The reason for this is mainly server load bal-
ancing, i.e., the same website is concurrently served from
numerous different IP addresses which is a considerable per-
formance limitation of TFO.
• We investigate the configuration of the TFO protocol as
utilized by popular browsers. We observe that tracking pe-
riods for the Chrome, Firefox, and Opera browsers seem to
be not restricted at all. We successfully tracked successive
connections from these browsers for a period of ten days.
Furthermore, tracking is feasible for the tested setups across
private browsing modes, browser restarts, and even across
different browsers on the same OS. Online trackers can uti-
lize the presented mechanism to track users as a third-party
across multiple websites, and to track users across visits to
different websites, as long as they are served from the same
IP address.
• We propose TCP FOP as a cross-layer solution to overcome
the described privacy limitations of TLS over TFO. Further-
more, TCP FOP allows conducting abbreviated handshakes
for website revisits independently of the IP address of the
server, which significantly improves the performance of web-
site revisits compared to TLS over the TFO protocol. Our
solution uses an encrypted TLS channel to send Fast Open
cookies from the server to the client. We implemented TCP
FOP into the Linux kernel and in a TLS library to demonstrate
the real-world feasibility of our proposal. The evaluation of
our prototype indicates no additional delay compared to
TFO/TLS connection establishments.
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Figure 1: Handshakes in TCP Fast Open protocol.
Note that we responsibly disclosed the presented privacy con-
cerns regarding the TFO protocol to the vendors of popular browsers.
As a result of this disclosure, Mozilla deprecated the TFO protocol
on all branches of Firefox for all platforms [15].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
describes the connection establishment of the TCP Fast Open pro-
tocol, its deployment within the Alexa Top Sites lists, and evaluates
its real-world performance limitations. Section 3 reviews track-
ing via TFO cookies, privacy threats arising from host-based as
well as network-based attackers, and investigates the feasibility of
the presented tracking mechanism for popular browsers. Section 4
summarizes TCP FOP, its implementation, and presents evalua-
tion results. Related work is reviewed in Section 5, and Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 TCP FAST OPEN
In this section, we briefly describe the protocol handshake of
TCP Fast Open (TFO). Subsequently, we investigate the deployment
of the TFO protocol within the Alexa Top Million Sites. In this
process, we also analyze the performance impact of real-world load-
balancing on the rate of zero round-trip time (RTT) connection
establishment.
2.1 Background on TFO’s Connection
Establishment
TFO is defined in RFC 7413 [7] as an experimental TCP mechanism.
It allows saving up to one round-trip time compared to the standard
TCP handshake [23]. It differs from standard TCP in so far, that
during a successful TFO handshake the client caches a cookie, which
is presented by the client in subsequent connections. The TFO
cookie is encrypted and authenticated by the server and opaque to
the client. It contains among others information about the client’s
publicly visible IP address. Thus, if the client is able to present a
cookie which matches its publicly visible IP address, the server can
assume that IP source address spoofing is unlikely by this client.
For these matching IP addresses, the server does not validate the
client’s source address via an additional message exchange. This
abbreviation allows the client to establish a connection without
waiting for the server response. Thus, application data can be sent
immediately along with the first client message. Figure 1 shows a
schematic of the TFO handshakes.
Initial handshake: At the beginning, the client has no infor-
mation about the server. Like in a TCP three-way handshake [23]
the client initiates a connection by sending a SYN to the server as
shown in Figure 1a. This SYN includes a TCP option that requests
a TFO cookie from the server. The server confirms the connection
request with a message containing a SYN-ACK and a TFO cookie.
The client then caches the TFO cookie as an opaque data block for
the establishment of subsequent connections. The server is now
waiting for the client to confirm the SYN-ACK. For that, the client
sends an ACK that completes the three-way handshake. The now
established connection is now a standard TCP connection.
0-RTT handshake: For subsequent connections to the same
server, the client utilizes the previously retrieved TFO cookie. For
that, it sends the cookie as part of the SYN message to the server as
shown in Figure 1b and c. Additionally, the client can include appli-
cation data as a payload within the SYN message. Upon receiving
the client’s connection request, the server validates the included
TFO cookie.
If the cookie is valid, then the server accepts the connection
request with the attached application data. As a response, the server
sends a SYN-ACK, which acknowledges the client’s SYN message
and the length of the received application data (see Figure 1b). This
SYN-ACK message can contain application data as a payload. In
total, this abbreviated connection establishment saves one round-
trip time of delay compared to TCP’s three-way handshake.
In case of an invalid cookie, the server drops the application
data of the client as shown in Figure 1c. In doing so, the server
sends a SYN-ACK which only acknowledges the client’s SYN but
not the application data. Moreover, the server generates a new TFO
cookie for the client and attaches this as a payload to the SYN-ACK.
Thereafter, the client replaces the cached cookie_1 with the fresh
cookie_2, which can be used in subsequent 0-RTT handshakes (see
Figure 1c). Note, that a rejected 0-RTT handshake only incurs the
same delay as a standard TCP three-way handshake.
2.2 Evaluation
In this section, we first investigate the deployment of TFO within
the Alexa Top Million Sites. With respect to user tracking via TFO,
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this allows us to determine an upper limit of websites which pos-
sibly deploy TFO to track their visitors. Based upon a sample size
of approx. 30 000 websites within the Alexa Top Million, we then
investigate to which extent changing server IP addresses affect the
performance gains that are achievable by TFO.
2.2.1 Deployment of TFO. Major operating systems such as Win-
dows, macOS, Linux, FreeBSD, Android, and iOS support the TFO
protocol, which is a precondition for its widespread adoption. How-
ever, these implementations do not set TFO as a default for all TCP
connections and thus it still requires modifications to the client-
and server-side applications to be used. RFC 7413 that describes
the TFO protocol was published in December 2014 [7]. We thus
assume that our measurement of the TFO deployment investigates
an early-stage in the wide-spread adoption of this protocol that we
expect in the near future.
To approximate the deployment of TCP Fast Open on the Internet,
we investigate the support for TFO within the Alexa Top Million
Sites [1]. For this purpose, we sent a SYN package containing a
TFO cookie request as shown in Figure 1 a) to each of these sites. If
the respective website responded with a SYN-ACK including a TFO
cookie, we consider this site to support the TFO protocol and the
contrary otherwise. We limited our scans to port 443 on the targeted
web server as the standard port for HTTPS web services [24]. We
conducted this measurement on the 10th of August 2018 with a
dedicated Python script.
Table 1: Websites with TFO-support in Alexa Top lists
Alexa Top lists Share of websites with TFO-support
Alexa Top 10 60.0%
Alexa Top 100 28.0%
Alexa Top 1K 12.4%
Alexa Top 10K 5.9%
Alexa Top 100K 3.4%
Alexa Top 1M 3.2%
Table 1 shows the number of websites supporting the TCP Fast
Open protocol within different Alexa Top lists. We find that 60%
of the ten most popular websites support this protocol. However,
this fraction decreases with the size of the Alexa Top list. While
28% among the Top Hundred websites still enable TCP Fast Open
handshakes, this share decreases to 3.2% within the Top Million
sites. We assume that higher ranked websites tend to adopt new
protocols such as TCP Fast Open earlier than other websites, which
leads to a gap in the deployment share between the different Alexa
Top lists.
2.2.2 Performance Limitations of TFO. Revisits of a website are
not necessarily served from the same IP address. However, the
TFO protocol instructs to utilize a cached Fast Open cookie only if
the source IP address, destination IP address, and the destination
port match those of the TCP connection in which the cookie was
issued. As a result, any time the website is served from a different
IP address the client experiences a cache miss even if a Fast Open
cookie from that website is stored in the TCP cache. To assess the
performance impact of this TCP Fast Open design, we observe the IP
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Figure 2: Share of websites plotted over the number of ob-
served server IP addresses for ten website visits.
addresses of the responding servers while visiting a website several
times. We conducted this measurement from an IPv4 address on
August 24th, 2018. In total, we connected to 32 099 websites that
we identified in our previous measurement as sites supporting the
TFO protocol. We visited these sites ten times within intervals of 45
minutes between each successive visit and observed the respective
server’s IP addresses. About 94% of these websites indicated, at each
of these visits, support for the TFO protocol. The remaining 6% can
be attributed to websites that are served from multiple servers and
not all of them support the TFO protocol. Figure 2 shows for these
30 218 websites the number of observed IP addresses per site. Our
results indicate, that at least 81% of the tested websites are served
from several IP addresses. We also find, that the second visit of a
website introduces 11 876 new IP addresses compared to the first
visit. As shown in Figure 3, the first TFO revisit of a website fails
with a chance of 39.3% due to the fact that the website is served
from a different IP address. For the third visit of a site, we observe
an average failure rate of 24.7%. On average, the tested websites are
served each from 2.1 different IP addresses across ourmeasurements.
We conclude that the binding of TFO cookies to a specific server IP
address presents a significant real-world performance limitation in
the context of web browsing.
3 TRACKING VIA TCP FAST OPEN
In this section, we begin by introducing a method which allows
user tracking via the TFO protocol. Then, we describe details on
tracking through host-based and network-based attackers via this
protocol. Afterwards, we point out limitations of the user iden-
tification via Fast Open cookies. Finally, we evaluate the default
configuration of popular web browsers regarding TFO to assess the
real-world impact of the presented tracking mechanism.
3.1 User Identification via Fast Open Cookies
The TFO protocol utilizes cookies to authenticate a client upon
consecutive visits of a web service. These cookies are generated
by the server and allow to identify clients with up to 16 bytes of
entropy [7]. Furthermore, they allow the server to link all connec-
tions to the same client, where a unique cookie was used. Moreover,
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Figure 3: Failure rate to conduct abbreviatedhandshakes due
to fresh server IP addresses plotted over successive visits of
the websites with TFO-support within Alexa Top Million.
a failed authentication as shown in Figure 1c allows the server to
link the fresh cookie_2 to the same client that was previously using
cookie_1. Following the specification, the client should then use the
fresh cookie_2 for subsequent connections to the same server.
While the specification of TCP Fast Open does not discuss its
possible impact on the client’s privacy, it remains unclear so far
whether and how the implementations address the mitigation of
the following privacy risks.
3.1.1 Length of Tracking Periods. The aggregation of long-term
user profiles is facilitated if a tracking mechanism enables long
tracking periods. Furthermore, tracking can become impracticable
when the tracking period of a mechanism is too short and poten-
tially expires before a user revisits the tracking server. Hence, the
feasible tracking duration is a significant characteristic of tracking
mechanisms. Tracking periods via TFO are limited by the uptime of
an OS because a restart clears the corresponding TCP cache. How-
ever, especially mobile devices such as smartphones can achieve an
uptime of several days or weeks under real-world conditions and
thus allow for tracking periods of a similar duration. Furthermore,
the TCP cache has a limited size, which under certain circumstances
leads to the replacement of old entries through fresh ones [2].
3.1.2 Linking several Applications to the same User. Popular oper-
ating systems such as Windows 10 [14], Linux [25] and macOS [5]
implement TCP Fast Open within their kernels. They also provide
a cache to store information about TCP connections such as the
described Fast Open cookies. This TCP cache is shared across all
user space applications. As a result, applications A and B on the
same OS instance will possibly use the same Fast Open cookie when
communicating with the same online service. Thus, by using TFO
tracking, a tracker can link several applications on the same OS
instance to one client.
3.2 Tracking by a Host-based Attacker
Tracking through a single visited website presents a privacy issue.
However, these privacy risks are amplified if a tracker can identify
a user across several visited websites. In the remainder of this
section, we describe third-party tracking and tracking across virtual
domains which both allow tracking users across multiple websites
via the TFO protocol.
3.2.1 Third-party Tracking. Third-party tracking refers to a prac-
tice, where a party, other than the targeted website, can track a
userâĂŹs visit. This is a common practice on the Internet where
Google’s software, alone, is present on approximately 80% of the
Alexa Top Million Sites [9]. Furthermore, previous measurements
indicate that a website within the Alexa Top 500 categories includes
on average 17.7 third-party trackers [9]. The presented tracking
mechanism allows identifying users across all websites where a
corresponding tracker is included as a third-party. However, to dis-
tinguish the various first-party sites that a user visited, the tracker
requires an additional identifier such as an HTTP referrer or a
custom URL per first-party.
3.2.2 Tracking across virtual Domains. In virtual hosting, multiple
virtual domains are hosted on a single server or pool of servers. This
approach allows sharing resources like the IP address and server
hardware across domains. When website A and B share the same
IP address, then a TFO connection to both websites will contain
the same cookie. Hence, an operator of a virtual hosting platform
can link visits of the same user across the hosted virtual domains.
3.3 Tracking by a Network-based Attacker
TCP provides an unencrypted connection. Thus, a network-based
attacker can observe the content of TCP headers and can link ob-
served Fast Open cookies to specific clients as a tracking web server
can do. This undermines the efforts of protocols such as TLS 1.3 [27]
that aim to protect against tracking by a network-based attacker. As
a result, a tracker would simply use Fast Open cookies to identify
users for TLS sessions that all run over TFO.
3.4 Limitations of the Cookie-based User
Identification
Fast Open cookies are part of the TCP header and therefore trans-
mitted over the network in clear text and without any protection
of integrity. Consequently, a network-based attacker is able to ma-
nipulate them. Neither TCP nor the Fast Open extension provide a
mechanism that allows the client to verify the integrity of received
cookies. Furthermore, a network-based attacker can replay an ob-
served Fast Open cookie to establish a connection with a 0-RTT
handshake. Consequently, Fast Open cookies do not assure the
identity of a client in the presence of a network-based attacker.
3.5 Evaluation
To explore the real-world feasibility of user tracking via the TFO
protocol, we investigated popular web browsers on different oper-
ating systems. In total, we conducted eight browser experiments,
whose methodology and results we presented in this section.
3.5.1 Status of TFO on the test systems. The privacy problems of
TFO are relevant to all applications that use this protocol. However,
within the scope of this work we focus our investigation on popular
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web browsers because of their important role to protect users’ web
browsing behaviour against illegitimate online tracking.
In our sample of popular web browsers, we included the Top 3
mobile [29] and the Top 6 desktop browsers [28]. We tested those
browsers on up-to-date versions of Android, iOS, Linux, macOS, and
Windows 10 and investigated their support for the TFO protocol
by analyzing the network traffic between browser and server.
We find, that the deployment of the TFO protocol in popular
browsers is still at an early stage. Thus, only Microsoft Edge on
Windows 10 supports TFO by default. Firefox, Chrome, and Opera
support the TFO protocol as an experimental feature under several
operating systems as shown in Table 2. Note, that TFO is activated
by default within Firefox Nightly and Firefox Beta under macOS
and Windows 10 which indicates preparations to further deploy
TFO across the Firefox platforms. Our tests for iOS 11 and Android
Kernel 4.10 did not reveal any popular browser which supports
TFO.
Note, that the TFO implementation of Microsoft Edge did not
work reliably within the IPv4 network stack. To overcome this issue,
we tested this browser with an IPv6 network stack, while all other
test systems deployed IPv4.
3.5.2 Feasible tracking periods. Thismeasurement studies the lower
boundary of feasible tracking periods via the presented approach.
For that, we visited a website that supports TFO. In between dif-
ferent visits, we closed the browser tab that was in use and left
the browser idle in the background of the operating system. After
one hour, we attempted to revisit the same website served from the
same IP address. By a manual analysis of the network traffic be-
tween the browser and the server we observed whether the browser
attempted to use the cached Fast Open cookie from the first website
visit to establish the fresh connection. If the browser makes use of
the cookie, we can then assume that it is feasible to track users with
the deployed test setup and for the duration of our test. Next, we
repeated this measurement with a fresh TCP cache and increasing
pauses between consecutive website visits, for pauses of up to ten
days.
We found that none of the IPv4-based test setups indicated a
restriction of the feasible tracking period. Thus, we could track all
Chrome, Firefox and Opera setups as shown in Table 2 for the entire
test period of ten days. Furthermore, this indicates that the tested
operating systems do currently not apply restrictions for feasible
tracking periods via the TFO protocol.
For the Microsoft Edge browser, we were required to conduct
this experiment on an IPv6 network stack, which diverts from our
other browser test setups. We observed, that within the Windows
10 default configuration, the Edge browser utilizes temporary IPv6
addresses [18] within the available address block. As a privacy
feature, the lifetime of these temporary addresses is limited to
24 hours by Windows 10. Thus, this test setup changes its global
IPv6 address after 24 hours, even when the assigned IPv6 address
block remains the same. However, the TFO protocol only uses
cached Fast Open cookies if the source IP address of the test system
is the same as in the TFO connection from which the cookie was
retrieved. As a result, the observed tracking periods terminate with
the change of the temporary IPv6 address.
User
Website A
(incl. T)
Website B
(incl. T)
Third-party T
Loading Website A
Loading Website B
Figure 4: Testbed to measure browser behavior regarding
third-party tracking.
3.5.3 Tracking across third-parties. This measurement investigates
the feasibility of third-party tracking via the TFO protocol. Figure 4
shows a schematic of the deployed test setup for this experiment.
To conduct this measurement, we require two websites A and B
that include the same third-party T . We visited website A and
validated that the browser received a Fast Open cookie from the
third-party T by manually analyzing the network traffic. After
closing the browser tab in-use, we waited for 30 minutes for open
TFO connections to time out [13]. We then visited website B and
investigated the network traffic between the browser and the third-
party T . If the browser attempted to use the cached Fast Open
cookie for the connection establishment with T , we could conclude
that third-party tracking via TCP Fast Open is feasible with this
browser.
As shown in Table 2, none of the tested browsers applied mecha-
nisms to prevent third-party tracking via Fast Open cookies. Thus,
third-parties present on several websites can track the same user’s
visits across all those sites.
3.5.4 Tracking across virtual hosts. This experiment is used to in-
vestigate the feasibility of tracking across virtual hosts. It requires
two websites whose DNS entries direct to the same IP address.
We connected to one of these websites and afterwards closed the
browser tab and waited for 30 minutes to ensure that TCP connec-
tions to that website timed out. We then connected to the second
website and monitored the respective network traffic of this connec-
tion. If the second connection uses the Fast Open cookie, which was
retrieved during the connection to the first website, we conclude
that tracking across virtual hosts is feasible with the tested browser.
Our evaluation indicates that the investigated browsers do not
prevent tracking across virtual hosts (see Table 2). Therefore, when
multiple websites are served from the same IP address, the service
operator can identify users across those hosted websites.
3.5.5 Tracking across IP address changes. This test investigates the
browser behavior regarding TFO when the operating system gets
a new IP address assigned. To assess this behavior, we visited a
website and closed the browser tab afterwards. While the browser
was running idle in the background of the operating system, we
assigned a new IP address to the device. Then, we revisited the
website with the tested browser instance and monitored the net-
work traffic of the connection. If the browser reuses the cached Fast
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Table 2: TCP Fast Open default configuration of popular browsers. Note, that the experiments with the Edge browser only
worked reliably with IPv6, while all other setups where tested with IPv4. Due to the feature of temporary IPv6 addresses, the
default Windows 10 behavior issues a fresh temporary IPv6 address every 24 hours, which is then used by the Edge browser.
Tracking across
Browser/Test system Status Tracking
periods
Third-
parties
Virtual
hosts
IP addr.
changes
Private
browsing
modes
User appli-
cations
Browser
restarts
Chrome v68/Ubuntu 18.04 support unrestricted viable viable blocked viable viable viable
Firefox v61/Ubuntu 18.04 support unrestricted viable viable blocked viable viable viable
Firefox v61/macOS 10.13 support∗ unrestricted viable viable blocked viable viable viable
Firefox v61/Windows 10 support∗ unrestricted viable viable blocked viable viable viable
Edge v42/Windows 10 default 24 hours viable viable blocked viable viable viable
Opera v54/Ubuntu 18.04 support unrestricted viable viable blocked viable viable viable
∗Activated by default within Firefox Nightly and Firefox Beta.
Open cookie of the website, we can conclude that tracking across
IP address changes is feasible.
We observed, that user tracking is not feasible across IP address
changes of the client as shown in Table 2. However, considering
a common consumer setup, where devices reside in a private net-
work that is connected to the Internet through a NAT gateway,
such devices typically keep their local IP addresses unchanged in-
definitely, since DHCP servers deterministically reassign the same
local IP address based on unchanging features like the client’s MAC
address. In such a setup, the client’s unchanging local IP address is
independent of the public IP address, which is assigned to the NAT
gateway. Thus, even after a change of the public IP address, the
client will try to connect using the previously cached Fast Open
cookies, which are bound to the unchanged local sender address.
As a consequence, this allows a tracking server to learn a client’s
new publicly visible IP address and continue its tracking activities
across the IP address change.
3.5.6 Tracking across private browsing modes. This experiment
explores whether user tracking via TFO is feasible across browsers’
default and private browsing mode. To assess this browser behavior,
we visited a website in the default mode of a browser. Then, the
respective browser tab was closed and switched to the private
browsing mode. While monitoring the network traffic, we then
revisited the website. If the connection establishment in the private
browsing mode used the previously retrieved Fast Open cookie,
we could conclude that tracking across the browsing modes of the
tested browser is feasible.
As indicated in Table 2, all setups allow a remote online tracker to
identify their user across changes of their browsing mode. This ob-
served behavior presents a breach in the respective privacy modes,
which aim to discard cookies at the end of each private session [16].
3.5.7 Tracking across browser restarts. This measurement tests
whether tracking across browser restarts is feasible. To investi-
gate this browser behavior, we first visit a website and retrieve a
fresh Fast Open cookie. Then, we restart the browser and revisit
the same website while we monitor the respective network traffic.
If the browser reuses the cookie of the previous browser instance,
then we conclude that tracking across browser restarts is feasible
with the deployed setup.
We find, that none of the tested browsers prevents tracking via
Fast Open cookies across a browser restart (see Table 2).
3.5.8 Tracking across user applications. This experiment explores
tracking across different user applications on the same device. To
conduct the experiment, we retrieve a website and leave the respec-
tive browser idle in the background of the OS. Afterwards, we use
another application with support for the TCP Fast Open protocol
such as another browser or curl to retrieve the same website. By
monitoring the network traffic between the website and the operat-
ing system, we find out whether the second application reuses the
TCP Fast Open cookie of the tested browser. If so, then tracking
across user applications is feasible.
Our results indicate, that user tracking across applications on
the same client operating systems is viable for all tested setups (see
Table 2).
Summary. As a summary of these browser measurements, we
find that the use of the TFO protocol leads to great privacy risks
such as unrestricted tracking periods and cross-browser tracking.
Furthermore, our results indicate that this tracking mechanism is
very persistent and cannot be terminated by browser restarts or
a change of the browsing mode. We recommend browser vendors
to refrain from deploying the TFO protocol due to the presented
privacy problems.
4 TCP FAST OPEN PRIVACY
In this section, we introduce the TCP Fast Open Privacy (TCP
FOP) protocol, that addresses the performance and privacy limita-
tions of TLS over TFO. Then, we describe the implementation of
the novel TCP FOP protocol. Subsequently, we evaluate the privacy
and performance provided by the TCP FOP protocol. Finally, to
further substantiate the real-world applicability of TCP FOP, we
analyze the effects of TCP protocol entrenchment on the proposed
protocol.
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Figure 5: Proposed handshakes in TCP Fast Open protocol using TLS 1.3 as a secure channel.
4.1 Design of TCP FOP
TCP FOP builds upon the TFO protocol and continues the approach
to use Fast Open cookies to reduce the latency of the connection
establishment. These Fast Open cookies are generated by the server
and sent over an encrypted channel to the client. Because there
is no encrypted channel within TCP, we propose to use TLS for
this purpose. Our proposal requires an extension to TLS with an
additional message type that allows the client to request Fast Open
cookies and enables the server to provide such cookies over an
encrypted channel. The client stores a received cookie along with
the corresponding timestamp, the hostname, and a context identi-
fier. The timestamp is used to limit the period for which a cached
cookie can be used to attempt an abbreviated handshake. The host-
name is authenticated within the TLS handshake and can therefore
be associated with the cookie. The cached cookies are then used
to attempt abbreviated handshakes for matching hostnames in-
dependently of the server’s IP address. This modification allows
TCP FOP to anticipate load balancing of websites across several
IP addresses. However, it requires the involved servers to share
the cryptographic secret, that is used to encrypt/decrypt the cor-
responding Fast Open cookies. The context identifier is provided
by an application and marks the context in which the cookie was
retrieved. Thus, a browser can mark for example each Fast Open
cookie from a third-party with the context identifier of the corre-
sponding first party. As a result, this third-party cannot track the
client across several first party websites via the Fast Open cookie
because the usage of the cached cookie is only allowed for identical
context identifier. By changing the context identifier for events
like browser restarts or changes between browsing modes, user
tracking across these events/contexts is mitigated. Thus, to restrict
user tracking via host-based attackers, applications need to provide
context identifiers to limit the usage of retrieved Fast Open cookies.
Additionally, Fast Open cookies should not be reused to set up
several abbreviated connections.
In the following, we are describing the details of the TCP FOP
handshakes. Figure 5 shows a schematic of the proposed handshakes
that use TLS version 1.3 [27] as an encrypted channel.
Initial handshake: First, client and server use a standard three-
way handshake to establish a TCP connection. Second, the client
starts the modified TLS handshake with a client hello message
(CHLOFOP) that indicates support for TCP FOP. The server responds
with a server hello message (SHLO) that completes the cryptographic
handshake and allows sending subsequent messages over the es-
tablished TLS channel. Afterwards, the server generates a fresh
Fast Open cookie for the client and sends it over the TLS channel.
Finally, the client stores this message along with a timestamp, the
hostname and a context identifier in its TLS cache.
0-RTT handshake: To establish a new secure connection to
the same website with an abbreviated 0-RTT handshake, the TLS
implementation checks whether a valid Fast Open cookie is avail-
able in its TLS cache. A Fast Open cookie is valid if it has not yet
expired and the respective hostname and context identifier match.
Assuming a valid cookie, the client then calls a kernel function
with the cookie as a parameter that attempts to open a TCP FOP
connection. Then, the client sends a SYN message to the server
which includes the respective Fast Open cookie as shown in Fig-
ure 5b. Subsequently, the client starts its TLS handshake without
waiting for the server’s response. Figure 5b shows a 0-RTT TLS
handshake using session resumption for connection establishment
and directly sending an encrypted data request. Upon receiving
the client’s messages, the server validates the contained Fast Open
cookie before accepting the payload in the SYN packet. The server
then accepts the connection and the received TLS data by sending a
SYN-ACK message which acknowledges the entire client’s message.
Otherwise, the server acknowledges the connection only and drops
the TLS data that leads to a rejected 0-RTT handshake. Following
the flow of an accepted 0-RTT handshake attempt as shown in
Figure 5b, the server’s TLS application validates the client’s ses-
sion resumption data. Assuming these data to be valid, the server
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Table 3: Kernel API changes
API Name Description
TCP_Fast_Open_COOKIE_GEN This server-side API enables an application to retrieve a Fast Open cookie
for a specific client from the kernel.
TCP_Fast_Open_COOKIE_SET This client-side API enables an application to fill the TCP cache with a
specific cookie.
answers by sending a SHLOTLS, a response to the client’s request
and a fresh Fast Open cookie. By following this protocol flow (see
Figure 5b), the client-server pair can establish connections that
cover the transport and cryptographic handshake with 0-RTT.
Note, that in TLS version 1.3 [27] the session resumption mecha-
nism should not reuse identifiers for connection establishment to
prevent tracking by a network-based attacker. To extend this pro-
tection against this attacker to the TCP-layer, a Fast Open cookie
should not be reused to set up several connections.
4.2 Implementation of TCP FOP
In order to assess the feasibility of TCP FOP, we implemented it
on top of the Linux 4.18 kernel as well as the wolfSSL TLS library.
Our implementation required only minor modifications totaling
about 300 lines of code (LoC) for Linux and 400 LoC for wolfSSL,
including comments and debug output.
4.2.1 Kernel support. The Linux Kernel 4.18 already supports TCP
Fast Open. Thus, we largely reused the available TCP Fast Open im-
plementation for our demonstration, and as a noteworthy change,
we added two new APIs to the kernel as shown in Table 3. The API
TCP_Fast_Open_COOKIE_GEN enables the server’s TLS application
to retrieve a fresh Fast Open cookie for a specific client connec-
tion from its kernel. For the client, we added the inverted API call
which allows including a Fast Open cookie into the kernel’s cache
before the subsequent connection establishment. Our prototype
aims to evaluate, that the presented cross-layer approach adds no
substantial complexity to the workings of TCP and TLS.We observe,
that the implemented TCP_Fast_Open_COOKIE_GEN API works
independently of TCP’s connection handling. The TCP_Fast_Open-
_COOKIE_SET API provides a cookie which can be subsequently
used within a TCP handshake. However, this affects only the initial-
ization of TCP’s connection establishment. This creates no external
constraints on the handshake protocol itself. Furthermore, a Linux
kernel API to delete specific TCP Fast Open cookies [2] already
exists which also modifies the initialization of TCP’s connection
establishment. The proposed TCP_FOP_COOKIE_SET API only pro-
vides the logical counterpart to the existing delete mechanism. Thus,
we conclude based upon our implementation [3], that TCP FOP
introduces only lightweight modifications to TCP which lead to no
external constraints of TCP’s connection handling.
4.2.2 TLS support. We implemented our prototype [4] as part of
the open source TLS library wolfSSL that provides support for TLS
1.3. For practicality reasons, we decided to add Fast Open cookies
to the session resumption mechanism of TLS 1.3. However, for the
productive use of TCP FOP we recommend an implementation as a
dedicated TLS mechanism, i.e. an extension. We use TLS only as
a data channel for the cookie and to set the cookie into the TCP
cache during the establishment of a new connection. Therefore, our
implementation does not affect TLS’s cryptographic components
and its connection handling.
In the following, we briefly describe our workaround of imple-
menting TCP FOP by adapting the session resumption mechanism
of TLS 1.3. On the server-side, we include a new Fast Open cookie
which we generated with the TCP_Fast_Open_COOKIE_GEN API
into each TLS session resumption ticket. Thus, the TLS server would
subsequently send NewTicket messages which contain the Fast
Open cookie and the original session resumption ticket. Upon re-
ceiving such an extended NewTicket, the client stores it along with
its own connection state such as encryption keys within its TLS
cache. To establish a subsequent connection to the same hostname,
the client first validates that a session resumption with that website
complies with its privacy configuration. Assuming that this valida-
tion was successful, the client extracts the Fast Open cookie from
the cached session resumption ticket and stores it in the kernel’s
TCP cache using the TCP_Fast_Open_COOKIE_SET API. Subse-
quently, the client uses the session resumption ticket to establish a
resumed TLS session over TCP’s Fast Open extension. After this
connection is established, the client deletes the used Fast Open
cookie within the cache. To avoid the client identification based
on session resumption tickets through a network-based attacker,
the client shall not reuse the same ticket to set up connections
with the server. Analogous, each fresh session resumption ticket is
required to contain a fresh Fast Open cookie, so that a client cannot
be identified by a reuse of the same cookie.
4.3 Evaluation of TCP FOP
This section starts with an assessment of the privacy properties
of TCP FOP and a subsequent comparison to the previous exist-
ing TFO protocol. Next, a performance evaluation of TCP FOP is
presented based on experiments with the implemented prototype.
To investigate the real-world applicability of TCP FOP, this sec-
tion ends with a feasibility analysis studying possible deployment
issues.
4.3.1 Privacy Evaluation. Tracking via Fast Open Cookies is inde-
pendent of alternative tracking mechanisms such as HTTP Cookies,
browser fingerprinting, or IP addresses. To protect the privacy of
users, a network-based attacker can observe each utilized Fast Open
Cookie only once, namely during the 0-RTT handshake of TCP FOP.
From the perspective of a network-based attacker, these Fast Open
Cookies are encrypted data blocks and thus cannot be linked to
a specific user. Therefore, the TCP FOP protocol prevents attack-
ers to use Fast Open Cookies to re-identify specific users and to
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Table 4: Comparison of privacy characteristics between the TCP Fast Open protocol and our TFO proposal utilising TLS as a
secure channel.
Privacy characteristic TCP Fast Open Protocol TCP Fast Open Privacy Protocol
Tracking via network-based attacker viable blocked through single-use cookies & encrypted channel
Tracking across third-parties viable blocking possible through context identifier
Tracking across virtual hosts viable blocking possible through context identifier
Tracking across private browsing modes viable blocking possible through context identifier
Tracking across browser restarts viable blocking possible through context identifier
Tracking across user applications viable blocking possible through context identifier
Tracking across IP address changes blocked blocking possible through context identifier
Tracking periods unrestricted restriction possible through expiration of cookies
establish user profiles. Hence, tracking via network-based attack-
ers is not possible anymore, which is the most important privacy
achievement of TCP FOP.
However, when facing host-based attackers, the TCP FOP pro-
tocol faces a performance versus privacy tradeoff. The best user
privacy is achieved when doing initial handshakes only, while the
best performance is achieved during sequences of 0-RTT hand-
shakes. However, host-based attackers can link 0-RTT handshakes
to the same user by linking their Fast Open Cookies. In an initial
handshake, the user does not reuse Fast Open Cookies from a prior
connection, therefore user tracking is prevented. However, an ini-
tial TCP FOP handshake requires an additional round-trip time
compared to the 0-RTT connection establishment, which impacts
performance.
TCP FOP provides a mechanism to balance this tradeoff in the
context of specific applications. For that, Fast Open Cookies expire
after a certain lifetime, which limits the maximum tracking period
to this lifetime. The performance impact of such a lifetime approach
has been studied in prior research work [30]. This study of users’
browsing behavior indicates, that 17.7% of all revisits of websites
can use 0-RTT handshakes, if the lifetime of Fast Open Cookies is
set to five minutes. Increasing this lifetime to 60 minutes allows to
use 0-RTT handshakes for 48.3% of all website revisits. Thus, this
approach allows to strictly enforce an upper limit for the feasible
tracking period, while short Fast Open Cookie lifetimes still enable
a significant share of 0-RTT connection establishments.
The second countermeasure of the TCP FOP protocol against
host-based attackers, uses context identifiers associated to cached
Fast Open Cookies. These context identifiers are intended to strictly
enforce privacy policies in applications and therefore prioritize
privacy over performance. This approach restricts a client to use
only cached Fast Open Cookies for 0-RTT handshakes, if their
context identifier is identical to the active context of the application.
Defining the context in dependence of the visited party, virtual
host, IP address, browsing mode, user application, and browser
session logically excludes the tracking approaches observed in
Section 3.5. For example, by switching to the private browsing
mode, previously cached Fast Open Cookies cannot be used for
0-RTT handshakes, as they have been retrieved from the context of
a different browsing mode. However, each additional dependency
on the context identifier causes a further restriction for the use of
cached Fast Open Cookies, that will eventually affect the ratio of
initial and 0-RTT handshakes.
Table 4 summarizes our findings from Section 3.5 for the TFO
protocol and compares them to the privacy characteristics of TCP
FOP. We find that the TCP FOP protocol can heal all privacy issues
of TLS over TFO.
4.3.2 Performance Evaluation. We evaluate the performance of
the TCP FOP protocol in two parts: First, we conduct experiments
to investigate whether the usage of the proposed TCP FOP/TLS
incurs a delay overhead compared to connections using TFO/TLS or
standard TCP/TLS. Second, we study the performance of TCP/TLS,
TFO/TLS, and TCP FOP/TLS in a scenario with real-world load-
balancing.
Experiment using the TCP FOP Prototype. We compare our im-
plemented prototype of TCP FOP to implementations of standard
TCP and TFO. For that, we compare the required time to download
a small web page from a single host using one of these three trans-
port protocols in combination with TLS 1.3. For this experiment, we
use two virtual machines, one acting as web server and the other
one as client. The virtualization is realized on the same host using
qemu 2.8 and libvirt 3.0.0. This test setup leads to short network
latencies with an average ping of 0.3 milliseconds (ms) between the
virtual machines. The host of the virtual machines was equipped
with an Intel Xeon E5-1660 v4 CPU with 32GB of RAM and ran
Debian stretch. The client and server machine were set up with
4 GB of RAM and were running an Ubuntu 18.10 with our modified
Linux kernel (see Section 4.2.1) that supports the TCP FOP proto-
col. The server ran the example server program shipped with our
modified wolfSSL library. The program responds to a successful
connection establishment with a short string. The client ran the
corresponding example client program of wolfSSL that establishes
a TLS session to the server, waits for the short string from the
server and terminates the TLS session upon its reception. Note
that we used our modified wolfSSL implementation as described
in Section 4.2.2 for this measurement. In our experiment we estab-
lished and resumed a new TLS connection via standard TCP, TFO,
or TCP FOP. All of these TLS connections used the forward-secure
cipher suite TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. The initial TLS connec-
tion used thereby an initial handshake of the corresponding TCP
variant. The 0-RTT TLS resumption handshake used an abbreviated
TCP connection establishment, if supported by the respective TCP
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Table 5:Mean duration to establish a connection between the client-server pair and to download a smallwebsite usingTCP/TLS,
TFO/TLS, and TCP FOP/TLS. The standard deviation of the mean duration is denoted in brackets. Initial connections use the
initial handshake of the respective TCP variant and a full TLS 1.3 handshake. Resumed connections utilize a 0-RTThandshake
if supported by the respective TCP variant and a resumed 0-RTT TLS 1.3 connection establishment.
Network TCP/TLS TFO/TLS TCP FOP/TLS
latency [ms] Initial [ms] Resumed [ms] Initial [ms] Resumed [ms] Initial [ms] Resumed [ms]
≈0.3 28.9 (3.6) 20.2 (2.7) 29.9 (3.5) 22.3 (2.9) 29.6 (3.6) 22.2 (2.9)
50 ms 189.8 (2.5) 132.6 (1.7) 190.0 (2.4) 83.7 (1.9) 190.0 (2.6) 83.8 (2.2)
100 ms 340.2 (2.1) 233.1 (1.4) 340.3 (2.1) 135.1 (1.6) 340.7 (2.1) 135.4 (1.6)
150 ms 490.3 (1.8) 332.9 (1.3) 490.7 (1.8) 185.3 (1.4) 491.1 (1.8) 185.7 (1.4)
variant. To account for skews in the measurements, we repeated
the experiment 1000 times and measured the elapsed wall-clock
time. We conducted our measurements with the client’s network
interface configured to simulate network latencies of 0.3 ms, 50 ms,
100 ms, and 150 ms with iproute2’s tc program. We recorded and
inspected the network traffic of the virtual network interface to
validate a correct behavior of our evaluation setup.
The results of the measurement are shown in Table 5. We find
that for minimal network latencies of 0.3 ms TLS over the standard
TCP provides the best performance results, while the usage of
TFO/TLS and TCP FOP/TLS leads to similar values. Especially, in
the case of a resumed handshake the usage of the standard TCP
provides a performance gain of almost ten percent. We assume, that
TFO and TCP FOP have a computational overhead by generating,
validating, and handling the Fast Open Cookies that incurs this
delay.
In total, our results indicate only small differences between the
performance of the initial handshake measurements which are
consistently less than a millisecond between the investigated TCP
variants for the same network latency. For resumed handshakes,
the performance benefits of TFO/TLS and TCP FOP/TLS are signif-
icant for larger network latencies. These protocols complete the
resumption handshake with time savings larger than 50% for net-
work latencies of 50 ms and above compared to TLS over standard
TCP. These benefits account to the saved round-trip time of the
0-RTT handshakes of TFO and TCP FOP.
Between the performance of TFO/TLS and TCP FOP/TLS, we find
only insignificant differences. As a result of this measurement, we
find that TFO/TLS and TCP FOP/TLS have a similar computational
overhead.
Simulation considering Load-balancing. Clients using the TCP
FOP/TLS associate a retrieved Fast Open Cookie with the hostname
of the respective online service. This allows them to attempt 0-
RTT handshakes with online services with matching hostnames
independently of the server’s IP address. Divertingly, the TFO/TLS
is restricted to conduct 0-RTT handshakes only when the server’s
IP address matches the one associated to the cached Fast Open
Cookie. This simulation investigates the performance benefits of
this adapted design of the TCP FOP/TLS protocol stack.
Our test setup consists of a client, a network link, and a website.
For the network link we assume a mobile LTE connection, with
a round-trip time of 60 ms as it is common in the U.S. [20]. Note,
that the round-trip time for 3G and WiFi connections are on aver-
age longer than for LTE connections [19]. Statistically, an average
website requires 20 TCP/TLS connections to several hosts for its
retrieval [32]. To resemble a real-world website, our test website
directly links to 19 resources, each of them on a separate host. From
the perspective of a domain tree, these 19 hosts are on the same
hierarchical level. Furthermore, we assume that all hosts in this test
setup support the TCP FOP protocol and use on average the same
load-balancing approaches as observed in Section 2.2.2 for hosts
supporting TFO. The client measures the elapsed wall-clock time
to establish connections to all 20 hosts that need to be involved to
retrieve the website.
Table 6 summarizes the results for successive revisits of test
website. As the TCP FOP/TLS protocol stack can establish 0-RTT
connections independently of the IP address associated to a host-
name, it saves on each revisit of the website two round-trip times
compared to the initial website visit. One RTT can be saved when
connecting to the primary host, and another RTT can be saved by
successfully establishing 0-RTT connections to the 19 secondary
hosts. For each website revisit with the TCP FOP/TLS, this reduces
the delay overhead for establishing connections to all 20 hosts by
120 ms compared to the initial visit at the website. As indicated in
Figure 3, the failure rate of the TFO/TLS protocol stack depends on
the number of prior visits to a website. We used a tree diagram to
compute the probabilities of saving zero, one, or two RTT during
the connection establishment with all 20 hosts. We find, that for
the first revisit the probability of saving a RTT during the connec-
tion establishment to all hosts is 60.7% and on average the delay
overhead is reduced by 36.4 ms. Note, that the saving of the TCP
FOP/TLS protocol stack for the same task is more than three times
higher with 120 ms. For the second and third revisit to the web-
site, the achieved reductions are 45.5 ms and 63.1 ms, respectively.
Thus, we observe that the TCP FOP/TLS protocol stack significantly
outperforms TFO/TLS, if real-world load-balancing of websites is
considered.
4.3.3 Feasibility Analysis. Efforts to deploy alternative TCP ver-
sions on the Internet indicate thatmiddleboxes such as Firewalls and
NAT devices modify or block unfamiliar TCP packets [26]. Hence,
even simple changes to TCP require a long time before they ex-
hibit a significant deployment [10]. The TFO protocol faces similar
problems that hinder its rapid deployment on the web [7, 21]. The
presented TCP FOP embeds a standard TCP three-way handshake
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Table 6: Analysis of the delay overhead of TFO/TLS and TCP FOP/TLS compared to TCP/TLS. We simulate the retrieval of a
sample website and consider load-balancing as observed in Section 2.2.2. We assume a RTT of 60ms for the LTE connection.
1st Revisit 2nd Revisit 3th Revisit
Simulation TFO/TLS TCP FOP/TLS TFO/TLS TCP FOP/TLS TFO/TLS TCP FOP/TLS
Probability to save zero RTT 39.3% 0.0% 24.6% 0.0% 8.1% 0.0%
Probability to save one RTT 60.7% 0.0% 75.1% 0.0% 78.5% 0.0%
Probability to save two RTT 0.0% 100.0% 0.3% 100.0% 13.4% 100.0%
Mean delay overhead over LTE -36.4 ms -120.0 ms -45.5 ms -120.0 ms -63.1 ms -120.0 ms
in the initial handshake. This standard handshake is common on the
web and thus will not cause any issues with middleboxes [26]. The
exchanged messages in TCP FOP’s 0-RTT handshake are identical
to the messages in the TFO protocol (see Figure 1b and c). Note,
that for privacy reasons the cookie_2 of a rejected 0-RTT handshake
should be discarded by the client and not be used to establish new
TCP FOP connections. These identical protocol flows for TFO’s
and TCP FOP’s 0-RTT handshakes avoid further deployment is-
sues. Thus, middleboxes supporting TFO’s 0-RTT handshake will
by default also support the TCP FOP protocol.
As a result, the deployment of TCP FOP/TLS on the Internet is
not causing additional compatibility issues beyond the ones from
the TFO/TLS protocol stack.
A problem might arise with middleboxes that block TFO due
to its initial handshake and not because of its 0-RTT connection
establishment. These middleboxes would hinder the deployment of
TFO, but not the one of TCP FOP as it uses the standard TCP three-
way handshake during the initial handshake. As a result, the TCP
FOP protocol achieves from an analytical perspective a better de-
ployment on the Internet than TFO. However, we approximate the
practical benefit of this modification to be small because empirical
investigations indicate a success-rate of TFO connection establish-
ments on the Internet of about 80% and these investigations mainly
highlight other deployment issues of TFO [21].
Summary. Based on our evaluation, we find that TCP FOP/TLS
significantly improves the privacy and real-word performance of
TLS over TFO. With respect to privacy, all identified privacy issues
of TLS over TFO can be addressed by TCP FOP/TLS. From a perfor-
mance perspective, the TCP FOP/TLS protocol stack outperformed
TLS over TFO in our test scenario that resembles the retrieval of
an average real-world website. Furthermore, we conclude that TCP
FOP/TLS will experience less deployment issues than TLS over the
TFO protocol.
5 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report on privacy
aspects of the TFO protocol. While research work on privacy issues
within TCP that allows distinguishing clients or servers based on
their TCP timestamps [17, 22] exists, our reported storage-based
tracking mechanism is unrelated to such tracking approaches via
the TCP timestamps.
A similar tracking mechanisms has been reported for the QUIC
transport protocol [31]. However, QUIC’s address validation tokens
are distributed via an encrypted channel and do not allow a passive
network observer to correlate different connections to the same
user.
Furthermore, TLS session resumption mechanisms [30] enable
user tracking. Compared to the TFO protocol, Session resumption in
TLS 1.3 does not enable a passive network observer to track a user’s
online activities. Thus, the TFO protocol provides substantially
lower privacy guarantees then TLS 1.3.
Additionaly, prior research includes a proposed TCP extension
which directly allows to encrypt TCP packets [6]. This approach
significantly increase the complexity of TCP by including typical
TLS functionality. However, our proposed TCP FOP aims to be a
lightweight protocol modification where Fast Open cookies are
issued via a TLS-encrypted channel.
The limitation of the TFO protocol to anticipate load balancing
with multiple server IP addresses has been pointed out in prior
work [12]. We contributed by investigating this limitation under
real-world conditions and find that approx. 40% of the first website
revisits fail to establish an abbreviated connection setup.
TCP FOP presents a novel protocol which anticipates webserver
load balancing to achieve a higher share of abbreviated handshakes
and fully protects against tracking via network-based attackers.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present such a
cross-layer approach for the TLS over TFO stack.
6 CONCLUSION
TFO provides considerable latency improvements compared to
TCP’s three-way handshake, however its usage on the Internet
raises alarming privacy concerns. Therefore, we urge vendors of
operating systems and browsers to discourage the deployment of
the TFO protocol. To address the privacy problems at hand, we
designed and implemented the TCP FOP protocol. Our analysis in-
dicates that TLS over TCP FOP fully protects against user tracking
by network-based attackers. Furthermore, the protocol can also
restrict third-party tracking and enables each application to control
its privacy properties and to balance the trade-off between lower
delays and privacy protection. To that end, applications can influ-
ence the lifetime of cached Fast Open cookies, which represents the
maximum feasible tracking period. TCP FOP/TLS not only provides
better privacy protection, but it also provides significant perfor-
mance gains in terms of delay compared to TLS over TFO. TCP
FOP/TLS can carry out abbreviated TCP handshakes even when the
website is served from multiple IP addresses, e.g. when being part
of server load balancing. Our measurements indicate that TFO/TLS
fails to establish an abbreviated handshake with a chance of 39.3%
during the first revisit of a website. We attribute this mainly to
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server load balancing under which TCP FOP/TLS will always be
able to carry out an abbreviated handshake. We conclude that based
on our evaluations the proposed TCP FOP protocol leads to sub-
stantial enhancements of the performance and privacy of TLS over
TCP Fast Open.
REFERENCES
[1] Alexa Internet Inc. 2018. Alexa Top 1,000,000 Sites. Retrieved January 21, 2019
from http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
[2] Julian Anastasov. 2018. IP-TCP_METRICS. Retrieved January 21, 2019 from
man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ip-tcp_metrics.8.html
[3] Anonymous Author. 2018. Author’s patch to the Linux Kernel to implement TCP
FOP. Retrieved January 21, 2019 from http://paste.ubuntu.com/p/fyfTrgXmBj/
[4] Anonymous Author. 2018. Author’s patch to Wolfssl to implement TCP FOP.
Retrieved January 21, 2019 from http://paste.ubuntu.com/p/xJfgBh4SZW/
[5] Apple Inc. 2018. Your App and Next Generation Networks. Retrieved January
21, 2019 from https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2015/719/
[6] Andrea Bittau, Michael Hamburg, Mark Handley, DavidMazieres, and Dan Boneh.
2010. The case for ubiquitous transport-level encryption. USENIX Association.
[7] Yuchung Cheng, Jerry Chu, Sivasankar Radhakrishnan, and Arvind Jain. 2014.
TCP Fast Open. RFC 7413. https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC7413
[8] Peter Eckersley. 2010. How unique is your web browser?. In International Sym-
posium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium. Springer, 1–18.
[9] Steven Englehardt and Arvind Narayanan. 2016. Online tracking: A 1-million-site
measurement and analysis. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 1388–1401.
[10] Michio Honda, Yoshifumi Nishida, Costin Raiciu, Adam Greenhalgh, Mark Hand-
ley, and Hideyuki Tokuda. 2011. Is it still possible to extend TCP?. In Proceedings
of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference. ACM,
181–194.
[11] HTTP Archive. 2018. Report: State of the Web. Retrieved January 21, 2019 from
https://www.httparchive.org/reports/state-of-the-web
[12] Adam Langley, Alistair Riddoch, Alyssa Wilk, Antonio Vicente, Charles Krasic,
Dan Zhang, Fan Yang, Fedor Kouranov, Ian Swett, Janardhan Iyengar, et al. 2017.
The QUIC transport protocol: Design and Internet-scale deployment. In Proceed-
ings of the Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication.
ACM, 183–196.
[13] Linux man-pages project. 2018. tcp - TCP protocol. Retrieved January 21, 2019
from man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/tcp.7.htmll
[14] Microsoft. 2016. Windows 10 build 14352. Retrieved January 21, 2019
from https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/platform/changelog/
desktop/14352/
[15] Mozilla Corporation. 2018. User tracking via TCP Fast Open. Retrieved January
21, 2019 from https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1500224
[16] Mozilla Foundation. 2018. Private Browsing - Use Firefox without saving his-
tory. Retrieved January 21, 2019 from https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/
private-browsing-use-firefox-without-history
[17] Steven J Murdoch. 2006. Hot or not: Revealing hidden services by their clock
skew. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security. ACM, 27–36.
[18] Dr. Thomas Narten, Richard P. Draves, and Suresh Krishnan. 2007. Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6. RFC 4941. https:
//doi.org/10.17487/RFC4941
[19] OpenSignal. 2014. LTE Latency: How does it compare to other technolo-
gies? Retrieved January 21, 2019 from https://opensignal.com/blog/2014/03/10/
lte-latency-how-does-it-compare-to-other-technologies/
[20] OpenSignal. 2018. State of Mobile Networks: USA (July 2018). Re-
trieved January 21, 2019 from https://opensignal.com/reports/2018/07/usa/
state-of-the-mobile-network
[21] Christoph Paasch. 2016. Network support for TCP Fast Open. Retrieved January
21, 2019 from nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf
[22] Libor Polcák, Jakub Jirásek, and Petr Matousek. 2014. Comment on" Remote
Physical Device Fingerprinting". IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput. 11, 5 (2014),
494–496.
[23] Jon Postel. 1981. Transmission Control Protocol. RFC 793. https://doi.org/10.
17487/RFC0793
[24] Jon Postel and Joyce K. Reynolds. 1994. Assigned Numbers. RFC 1700. https:
//doi.org/10.17487/RFC1700
[25] Sivasankar Radhakrishnan, Yuchung Cheng, Jerry Chu, Arvind Jain, and Barath
Raghavan. 2011. TCP Fast Open. In Proceedings of the Seventh COnference on
Emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT ’11). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, Article 21, 12 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2079296.2079317
[26] Costin Raiciu, Christoph Paasch, Sebastien Barre, Alan Ford, Michio Honda,
Fabien Duchene, Olivier Bonaventure, and Mark Handley. 2012. How hard can
it be? designing and implementing a deployable multipath TCP. In Proceedings
of the 9th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation.
USENIX Association, 29–29.
[27] Eric Rescorla. 2018. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3.
RFC 8446. https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8446
[28] StatCounter. 2018. Desktop Browser Market Share Worldwide. Retrieved
January 21, 2019 from http://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/desktop
[29] StatCounter. 2018. Mobile Browser Market Share Worldwide. Retrieved January
21, 2019 from http://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/mobile
[30] Erik Sy, Christian Burkert, Hannes Federrath, andMathias Fischer. 2018. Tracking
Users Across the Web via TLS Session Resumption. In Proceedings of the 34th
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC ’18). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 289–299. https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274708
[31] Erik Sy, Christian Burkert, Hannes Federrath, and Mathias Fischer. 2019. A QUIC
Look at Web Tracking. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 3 (2019).
[32] Erik Sy, Moritz Moennich, Tobias Mueller, Hannes Federrath, and Mathias Fischer.
2019. Enhanced Performance for the encrypted Web through TLS Resumption
across Hostnames. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.02531 (2019).
